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ABSTRACT 
Normally, secure communication between client-server applications is established using 
secure channel technologies such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). TLS is cryptographic 
protocol which ensures secure transmission of data and authenticity of communication at 
each endpoint platform. However, the protocol does not provide any trustworthiness 
assurance of the involved endpoint. This paper incorporates remote attestation in the TLS key 
exchange protocol to solve this issue. The proposed embedded attestation extension in TLS 
protocol will provide assurance of sender's platforms integrity to receiver, and vice versa. The 
CA responsibility in TLS is replaced using own Trusted Certificate Authority (TCA) in our 
protocol. The credibility of the proposed protocol is studied to secure against replay attack 
and collusion attack. The proof is performed using AVISPA with High Level Protocol 
Specification (HLPSL) through Dolev-Yao intruder model implementation of the proposed 
protocol. 
Keyword: Certificate Authority (CA); Integrity; Remote attestation; SSL/TLS extension; 
TPM 
